INTERESTS
My research interests involve extending and applying theories of comparative political institutions and electoral incentives to distributive policymaking, representation, and bureaucratic behavior. In particular, I’m interested in explaining how political institutions such as electoral rules and executive-legislative arrangements systematically affect how elected officials and bureaucrats address policy issues that have local impacts. I am also interested in how elected and bureaucratic officials leverage science, evidence, and opinions in their policy decisions. Most of my empirical applications focus on climate change and environmental protection; I focus on these areas not only because they are well-suited for hypothesis testing, but because they are two of the greatest challenges facing the 21st century.
Related to this substantive work, I’m interested in developing computational text approaches for measuring the latent preferences and decision calculus of elected and bureaucratic officials, and utilizing geocoded indicators of social, political, and natural phenomena to test relationships. I exploit the timing and content of legislative and policy activities (such as speeches and policy documents) and use a combination of text mining, regression, spatial, and qualitative approaches in analyses. Alongside this research, I collaborate on projects that seek to improve measurement strategies for party scaling and party competition. Accurate measures are critical for advancing our understanding of how institutions and other political factors influence elite incentives and decisions.
My research has been funded by the UC Office of the President, the APSA Centennial Center, the Hemispheric Institute on the Americas-Tinker Foundation, and the UC Davis Political Science Department.
Related to this substantive work, I’m interested in developing computational text approaches for measuring the latent preferences and decision calculus of elected and bureaucratic officials, and utilizing geocoded indicators of social, political, and natural phenomena to test relationships. I exploit the timing and content of legislative and policy activities (such as speeches and policy documents) and use a combination of text mining, regression, spatial, and qualitative approaches in analyses. Alongside this research, I collaborate on projects that seek to improve measurement strategies for party scaling and party competition. Accurate measures are critical for advancing our understanding of how institutions and other political factors influence elite incentives and decisions.
My research has been funded by the UC Office of the President, the APSA Centennial Center, the Hemispheric Institute on the Americas-Tinker Foundation, and the UC Davis Political Science Department.
DISSERTATION
The Effects of Political Institutions on Distributive Response to Local Problems:
Applications to Environmental Issues and Drought
Applications to Environmental Issues and Drought
Representation and distributive policy are two interrelated pillars of politics. How elected representatives leverage distributive policy to represent constituents depends on the political institutions that shape their electoral and career incentives. Comparative political science shows that elected representatives have strong incentives to represent the constituents within their electoral jurisdiction in institutional contexts where legislators cultivate an individual reputation separate from their party (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Cain et al., 1984; Fenno, 1978). Consequently, they tend to pay most attention to the policy issues that affect their jurisdiction, working toward delivering local policy benefits to constituents therein. In contrast are elected representatives in party-based institutional contexts. Conventional wisdom is that elected representatives in these contexts have incentives to use the party label to claim credit, and therefore focus their attention on the national, ideological policies associated with their party's platform. Yet this assumption overlooks the fact that many policy problems have local impacts and require the distribution of local policy benefits. Accordingly, I argue that elected representatives in party-based systems also have incentives to pay attention to geographically-specific constituents, but they meet their incentives in ways that are electorally valuable to the party. I build theory and investigate support for my arguments in three papers that comprise this dissertation (abstracts below). Across all three papers, I use a combination of descriptive analysis, statistical modeling, text mining, and interviews in analyses. Contributions of this work include that it strengthens the analytical link between comparative political institutions and policy, further isolates the mechanisms that lead to different patterns of legislative attention, and advances knowledge on how electoral incentives influence decisions related to climate change.
"The Enduring Influence of Electoral Systems: Investigating Green Parties’ Attention to Local Issues in Parliament"
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 56(4): 523-546. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2018.1470157
Scholars argue that members of parliament (MPs) in first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems have stronger incentives to cater to constituents within their electoral district than those in proportional representation (PR) systems. Yet few studies have explored whether MPs in PR systems engage local issues, or considered whether these theories hold for small parties, whose vote-earning strategies are particularly critical for survival. I build new theory and explore its support with a case study that compares Green party behavior in an FPTP system (the UK) to a system with nationwide list PR (New Zealand). The study shows that MPs focus on local issues in both systems, but that the distribution of local attention varies considerably, and in ways consistent with differing electoral incentives.
"The Local Gone National: Explaining Legislative Response to Drought in the US & Australia"
Conventional wisdom is that legislators in party-based systems focus their attention on national, ideological policy instead of local issues. I argue that legislators have incentives to engage local issues, and that how these incentives are structured result in a broader distribution of local public goods. Unlike institutional contexts where legislators seek local public goods to build their own electoral support, legislators in party-based contexts seek them for the party’s electoral advantage. I use my argument to explain why distributive response to recent severe drought was designed to benefit some affected constituents in the US and most in Australia. To strengthen inferences, I analyze thousands of legislative speeches made on drought. Results show that legislators in both countries paid attention to drought impacts within their electoral constituency, but that members who led relevant policy portfolios in Australia addressed drought across jurisdictions.
"The Political in the Technical: Understanding the Influence of National Political Institutions on Climate Adaptation"
Revise & re-submit at Climate and Development.
A growing body of research shows that local and international institutions as well as party politics affect climate adaptation. Yet few studies have considered the role of political institutions at the national level. Comparative political institutional theory argues that a country’s party system, executive-legislative arrangement, and electoral rules affect elected officials’ incentives and behavior. This study utilizes this theory to explain how Chile’s national elected officials responded to the country’s extreme drought in 2010-2015. Results indicate that ideologically distinct alliances, a strong president, and legislators’ competing incentives to cater to different interests resulted in adaptive policy solutions that only partially addressed the shortcomings that drought exposed. The findings of this study show how politics can underlie technical decision-making on climate change, help to account for the continued inadequacies of Chilean water reform even in the face of new climate extremes, and demonstrate the utility of the comparative political institutional lens for explaining national strategies for climate adaptation. Applying this lens to other country cases and climatic events will advance knowledge on how differences in electoral incentives and policy processes systematically shape climate adaption policy.
"The Enduring Influence of Electoral Systems: Investigating Green Parties’ Attention to Local Issues in Parliament"
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 56(4): 523-546. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2018.1470157
Scholars argue that members of parliament (MPs) in first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems have stronger incentives to cater to constituents within their electoral district than those in proportional representation (PR) systems. Yet few studies have explored whether MPs in PR systems engage local issues, or considered whether these theories hold for small parties, whose vote-earning strategies are particularly critical for survival. I build new theory and explore its support with a case study that compares Green party behavior in an FPTP system (the UK) to a system with nationwide list PR (New Zealand). The study shows that MPs focus on local issues in both systems, but that the distribution of local attention varies considerably, and in ways consistent with differing electoral incentives.
"The Local Gone National: Explaining Legislative Response to Drought in the US & Australia"
Conventional wisdom is that legislators in party-based systems focus their attention on national, ideological policy instead of local issues. I argue that legislators have incentives to engage local issues, and that how these incentives are structured result in a broader distribution of local public goods. Unlike institutional contexts where legislators seek local public goods to build their own electoral support, legislators in party-based contexts seek them for the party’s electoral advantage. I use my argument to explain why distributive response to recent severe drought was designed to benefit some affected constituents in the US and most in Australia. To strengthen inferences, I analyze thousands of legislative speeches made on drought. Results show that legislators in both countries paid attention to drought impacts within their electoral constituency, but that members who led relevant policy portfolios in Australia addressed drought across jurisdictions.
"The Political in the Technical: Understanding the Influence of National Political Institutions on Climate Adaptation"
Revise & re-submit at Climate and Development.
A growing body of research shows that local and international institutions as well as party politics affect climate adaptation. Yet few studies have considered the role of political institutions at the national level. Comparative political institutional theory argues that a country’s party system, executive-legislative arrangement, and electoral rules affect elected officials’ incentives and behavior. This study utilizes this theory to explain how Chile’s national elected officials responded to the country’s extreme drought in 2010-2015. Results indicate that ideologically distinct alliances, a strong president, and legislators’ competing incentives to cater to different interests resulted in adaptive policy solutions that only partially addressed the shortcomings that drought exposed. The findings of this study show how politics can underlie technical decision-making on climate change, help to account for the continued inadequacies of Chilean water reform even in the face of new climate extremes, and demonstrate the utility of the comparative political institutional lens for explaining national strategies for climate adaptation. Applying this lens to other country cases and climatic events will advance knowledge on how differences in electoral incentives and policy processes systematically shape climate adaption policy.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS & WORKS IN PROGRESS
Struthers, Cory, Hare, Chris, & Ryan Bakker. "Bridging the Pond: Measuring Policy Positions in the US & Europe". 2019. Political Science Research Methods. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.22
Recent work has pioneered the use of expert surveys to estimate cross-national party positions in a common ideological space. In this paper, we report findings from an original dataset designed to evaluate bridging strategies between European and American party placements. Specifically, we compare the use of "anchoring vignettes'" (fictional party platforms) with an alternative approach that asks comparativist scholars who live in the US (whom we call transatlantic or TA experts) to place American parties and parties in their country of expertise on a series of issues scales. The results provide an optimistic assessment of the ability of TA experts to serve as valid bridges across the Atlantic. The resulting cross-comparable estimates of party positions show instances of both convergence and divergence between American and European party systems, including parallels between systems on the cross-cutting issue of international economic integration.
Struthers, Cory, Li, Yuhui, and Matthew Shugart. 2018. "Introducing New Multilevel Datasets: Party Systems at the District & National Levels". Research Note at Research & Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018813508
For decades, datasets on national level elections have contributed to knowledge on what shapes national party systems. More recently, datasets on elections at the district level (such as the Constituency-Level Electoral Archive) have advanced research on subnational party competition. Yet, to our knowledge, no publicly accessible dataset with observations of the party system at both national and district-levels exists, limiting the ease in which cross-level comparisons can be made. To fill this gap, we release two corresponding datasets, the National Level Party Systems dataset (NLPS) and the District Level Party Systems dataset (DPLS), where the unit of analysis the party system within either the national or district jurisdiction. More than fifty elections in the two datasets are overlapping, meaning they include observations for a single election at both the district and national levels. In addition to conventional measures like the effective number of parties, we also include underutilized variables, such as the size of the largest party and the vote shares for presidential candidates in corresponding elections, that will likely advance the comparative scholarship on political institutions and party systems.
“Policy or Politics? Investigating the Factors that Influence Bureaucratic Decision-Making”. Working paper, with Tyler Scott, Forrest Fleischman, and Gwen Arnold.
“Legislative Cooperation in Response to Extreme Drought in the US and Australia".
Working paper, with Mark Lubell.
"A Descriptive Account of the NEPA Process in the USFS".
Working paper, with Forrest Fleischman, Mike Dockry, Tyler Scott, & Gwen Arnold.
Party Personnel Strategies: How Electoral Systems Shape Parties' Legislative Organization
Book project, with Matthew Bergman, Ellis Krauss, Robert Pekkanen, & Matthew Shugart
Recent work has pioneered the use of expert surveys to estimate cross-national party positions in a common ideological space. In this paper, we report findings from an original dataset designed to evaluate bridging strategies between European and American party placements. Specifically, we compare the use of "anchoring vignettes'" (fictional party platforms) with an alternative approach that asks comparativist scholars who live in the US (whom we call transatlantic or TA experts) to place American parties and parties in their country of expertise on a series of issues scales. The results provide an optimistic assessment of the ability of TA experts to serve as valid bridges across the Atlantic. The resulting cross-comparable estimates of party positions show instances of both convergence and divergence between American and European party systems, including parallels between systems on the cross-cutting issue of international economic integration.
Struthers, Cory, Li, Yuhui, and Matthew Shugart. 2018. "Introducing New Multilevel Datasets: Party Systems at the District & National Levels". Research Note at Research & Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018813508
For decades, datasets on national level elections have contributed to knowledge on what shapes national party systems. More recently, datasets on elections at the district level (such as the Constituency-Level Electoral Archive) have advanced research on subnational party competition. Yet, to our knowledge, no publicly accessible dataset with observations of the party system at both national and district-levels exists, limiting the ease in which cross-level comparisons can be made. To fill this gap, we release two corresponding datasets, the National Level Party Systems dataset (NLPS) and the District Level Party Systems dataset (DPLS), where the unit of analysis the party system within either the national or district jurisdiction. More than fifty elections in the two datasets are overlapping, meaning they include observations for a single election at both the district and national levels. In addition to conventional measures like the effective number of parties, we also include underutilized variables, such as the size of the largest party and the vote shares for presidential candidates in corresponding elections, that will likely advance the comparative scholarship on political institutions and party systems.
“Policy or Politics? Investigating the Factors that Influence Bureaucratic Decision-Making”. Working paper, with Tyler Scott, Forrest Fleischman, and Gwen Arnold.
“Legislative Cooperation in Response to Extreme Drought in the US and Australia".
Working paper, with Mark Lubell.
"A Descriptive Account of the NEPA Process in the USFS".
Working paper, with Forrest Fleischman, Mike Dockry, Tyler Scott, & Gwen Arnold.
Party Personnel Strategies: How Electoral Systems Shape Parties' Legislative Organization
Book project, with Matthew Bergman, Ellis Krauss, Robert Pekkanen, & Matthew Shugart
